Ambassadors, dear guests,

I appreciate the opportunity to deliver the opening remarks for your important and timely discussions. 

I think it is safe to say that for almost a quarter of a century, or ever since Putin first became a public figure in Russian politics, his intentions have been largely misread. 

Individually as nations, and collectively as an Alliance, we may at times have become slightly too engaged in wishful thinking.

There was indeed much hope and optimism back in 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell. And the early nineteen nineties, as our friends across Central and Eastern Europe shook off the shackles of decades of repressive communist rule, certainly gave us tremendous joy and a great cause for celebration.

But we fell on black days.

The Balkan wars of the nineties were a stark reminder that there was no guarantee for continued peace and stability. Age old grievances and destructive nationalist sentiments still lurked beneath the surface. 

In Russia this was manifested by the brutal crackdown in Chechnya, especially in 1999 and 2000. It was a harbinger of things to come.

However, the West did not pay enough attention to what was going on in Russia, or the revanchist resentment seemingly driving Mr. Putin.

Russia was welcomed to every table and cooperative venue where its Soviet predecessor had been shunned. It was even invited to become the eighth member of what was for a while the G8, despite its economy being no larger than that of an average mid-size European country.

Russia suffered, and still suffers, from a multitude of economic, societal and demographic challenges. Its birth-rate is low, life expectancy is low and so is quality of life, especially outside the metropolitan cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

However, Russia has an abundance of grievances and delusions of grandeur. It also has nuclear weapons. 

At the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Mr. Putin showed up and spelled out his grievances in no uncertain terms. NATO enlargement was bad. US dominance unacceptable. Consequences should be expected. 

What came next should not have come as a surprise: In August of 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and took over South Ossetia and Abkhazia where Russian forces remain.

However, we in the West still did not seem to fully comprehend the significance of Putin’s revanchist resentment. In 2010 NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept wherein it was proclaimed “Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low.” 

Four years later Russia annexed the Crimea and started its war in Eastern Ukraine. This act of aggression was still met with disbelief. We tried accommodating the Russians. Agreements were signed. Minsk One and Minsk Two, but to no avail. 

Just over two years ago, Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine; a country Russia refers to as its brother nation, while at the same time denying it agency and the right to exist. This invasion has been brutal, bloody, and unfortunately seems to be at a stalemate.

It has however demonstrated quite clearly that we live in a different world. As much was recognized by NATO in 2022 when it agreed to a new Strategic Concept replacing the one from 2010. It was blunt in its assessment: “The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace.” 

Russia’s invasion has deeply altered the security situation in Europe. Its illegal and unjustified war against Ukraine is also an attack on the multilateral system and a blatant violation of international law.

Russia today poses an existential threat, and not just to Ukraine. It is a threat to freedom, democracy and to our way of life. We cannot stand idly by. We must act. Individually as well as collectively.

This is why I am presenting to parliament a policy of long-term commitment of significant economic, humanitarian, security, and defence support to Ukraine. Concurrently, we are working on a bilateral agreement on security cooperation and long-term support between Iceland and Ukraine, following from our commitment of alignment with the G7 statement on security guarantees in Vilnius last year.

It is my further intent to bolster Iceland’s commitment and contributions to its own and Allied overall defence. The correct response to increased risks and threats is better deterrence and preparedness. 

Denial and wishful thinking are not the basis of good policy. This has been firmly established and should be a clear lesson to us all moving forward. Thank you.